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Abstract: The Estonian Internet voting (EIV) scheme is a unique example of a long-term nation-wide, legally binding
electronic voting deployment. The EIV scheme is used in parallel with standard paper-based election day voting, of
course invalidating an already cast i-vote. This necessarily requires careful authentication of the eligible voters and
makes the Estonian identity card solution a crucial part of the scheme, however, note that Parsovs has recently drawn
attention to the security flaws found in Estonian ID-cards. In this study, we propose an e-voting scheme EIV-AC that
integrates the EIV scheme with anonymous credentials based on self-sovereign identity. In addition to the EIV scheme’s
security properties, the EIV-AC scheme further supports participation privacy, i.e. whether or not an eligible voter has
participated in an election is kept hidden – also from the election authorities.
Key words: Electronic voting, e-voting, Estonian Internet voting, privacy, anonymous credentials, self-sovereign
identity, distributed ledger technologies

1. Introduction
Bernhard et al. summarize the important requirements of secure elections, list the open questions for electronic
voting (e-voting) research and then survey the current standings of previously proposed e-voting systems [1].
A fundamental question included in this list is “Is there a suﬀiciently secure way to distribute credentials for
Internet voting?”. Voter authentication is the most crucial phase for any election system since it is the keystone
for assuring
• eligibility verifiability that is anyone should be able to check that each vote in the election outcome is cast
by an eligible voter and at most one vote per voter is included in the tallying [2],
• participation privacy, i.e. the fact of whether or not an eligible voter has participated in an election should
not be disclosed without the voter’s intention [3],
and hence for resisting especially to
• ballot stuﬀing attack, that tries to submit votes for voters who have not participated in the election or for
maliciously forged voter credentials,
• abstention attack in which an attacker, who has the list of the participants, tries to refrain voters from
voting [4].
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Voter authentication is typically handled either with internal (e.g., JCJ-Civitas [4], Australian iVote
[5]) or external (e.g., Estonian Internet Voting (EIV) [6]) authentication. Internal voter authentication-based
e-voting systems require a registration phase in which voters are first required to prove their identity to the
election registrars, register themselves and then get registration credentials in form of public-private key pairs or
private credentials to prove voter eligibility during the voting phase. Naturally, this registration phase increases
the need for trust in the elections’ central authorities and may cause ballot stuﬀing or abstention attacks if the
necessary precautions are not carefully taken or the registrars maliciously collude. Our motivation in this work is
to propose a different approach for securely distributing credentials for e-voting schemes by utilizing anonymous
credential-based self-sovereign identity as an external authentication. We are going to give an instantiation
based on the Estonian Internet voting (EIV) [6].
The Estonian Internet voting (EIV) scheme has been used in national-wide elections since 2005. EIV is
organized by the Estonian State Electoral Oﬀice ( EO ) along with the Information System Authority within a
one-week period before the actual election day. Voters can cast multiple votes by using EIV and/or cast votes
on the election day. In EIV , the last cast vote is tallied, but will be overruled by a cast paper vote. Since its
first use in 2005, the usage rate of EIV has increased over time. For instance, in the 2019 European Parliament
elections approximately 46.7% of all the votes were cast via the EIV scheme1 .
EIV scheme has been a subject of e-voting research and discussions since its first deployment. During the
2011 elections, a proof of concept vote manipulation attack was mounted [7]. As a counter-measure, optional
individual verification is integrated into EIV scheme [8]. In 2014, [9] analyzed the security of EIV scheme
based on various aspects and found that the scheme has serious architectural limitations and procedural gaps.
Consequently, the EIV IVXV framework was deployed in 2017 [6]. In 2019, the Minister of Foreign Trade and
Information Technology called together a committee that produced a list of open action items to potentially work
on. Based on this list, [10] draws attention to the electronic identity and summarizes possible improvements.
The Estonian Internet voting scheme relies heavily on the electronic identity (eID) infrastructure. Currently, three main eID solutions are in use and only two of them (ID-card and mID) are used for EIV.
• ID-card: is a compulsory identity document issued by the Police and Border Guard Board to all Estonian
citizens and the citizens of the European Union permanently residing in Estonia.
• Mobile-ID (mID): relies on the mobile phone SIM card as the key storage and cryptographic processor.
It can be activated by signing an mID service agreement with mobile operator or can be activated on the
Police and Border Guard Board website.
• Smart-ID (sID): is a mobile application that works as an identification solution for anyone that does not
have a SIM card in their smart device but needs to securely prove their online identity.
Among these identity solutions, ID-card is the most widely used; 67% of the Estonian residents use
the ID-card regularly2 . Recently, [11] has shown several security flaws in the ID-card manufacturing process.
These flaws include certificates with duplicate RSA public keys, private key generation outside the ID-card and
certificates with corrupted RSA public keys. As a result, [11] suggests looking for fault-tolerant identity designs.
EIV scheme does not satisfy participation privacy against the central authorities, since the signing key
pair, that is included in the ID-card, is used for vote signing while forming the ballot. An honest-but-curious
1 See

Statistics about Internet voting in Estonia for details.

2 https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-identity/id-card
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or a malicious adversary who gains access to the signed-encrypted ballots, can deduce the total list of eligible
voters who participated in the election. Since voting in Estonian elections is voluntary3 , instead of actually
identifying the participants, building an e-voting scheme on both eligibility verifiability and participation privacy
requirements would comply more with the privacy protection and data minimization acts, such as EU General
Data Protection Regulation.
Based on the facts given above, in this manuscript, we focus on updating the EIV scheme by integrating
it with an anonymous credentials-based self-sovereign identity solution. In contrast to the previous centralized,
federated and user-centric identity management solutions, self-sovereign identity (SSI) aims to provide individuals’ control over their identity, security, privacy and a single management platform for both real world and
digital identities. Most of the SSI solutions use a combination of distributed ledger technologies and anonymous credentials to create immutable identity records. Some examples of privacy-enhanced digital identity
frameworks that have been proposed are Identity Mixer, U-Prove, Privacy-ABCs, FIDO, U-port, Sovrin, [12].
A credential is a set of attributes belonging to an entity, such as national identity number, name,
birth date/place, residency, signed by an issuing authority. Traditional credential presenting schemes do not
support selective disclosure (presenting only a subset of the attributes) or proving ownership of attributes that
satisfy some predicates without actually revealing them. For instance, an ID-card can serve as a credential
to authenticate oneself. But when it is used for proving an age predicate fulfillment, it would also reveal all
the other attributes such as name, surname, etc. Anonymous credentials provide a privacy-preserving tool for
proving identity attributes and support various types of zero-knowledge proofs for the attributes.
Related Work. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that proposes an integration of EIV
scheme with anonymous credential-based self-sovereign identity.
An anonymous credential scheme is in fact a digital signature that enables credential issuance such that
one is able to eﬀiciently prove that one owns a digital signature on a particular set of attributes by some zeroknowledge protocols. Anonymous credentials were first introduced by Chaum [13] and later enhanced by Brands
[14], Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [15, 16] and Camenisch et al. [17]. Currently, Microsoft’s U-Prove is based
on [14], IBM’s IdeMix is based on [15] and Sovrin Foundation’s SSI solution is based on [15, 17]. Furthermore,
there are several organizations working towards anonymous credentials-based decentralized identity schemes and
standardization such as the World Wide Web Consortium Verifiable Credentials Working Group, Decentralized
Identity Foundation.
Contributions. In this manuscript, we propose an e-voting scheme EIV-AC that is an integration of
the Estonian Internet voting scheme with anonymous credentials-based self-sovereign identity solution. As
anonymous credential scheme, the BBS+ signature, given in [17], is chosen. This version of the BBS+ signature
is eﬀicient, built on a Type-3 pairings setting, supports selective disclosure proofs and can be further enriched
with zero knowledge range and set membership proofs.
The anonymous credential scheme provides privacy-preserving eligibility proof and an election-specific
signing key pair for each voter. This election-specific key is constructed by the master secret included in the
anonymous credential and the unique election tag published by the election organizer EO, so that all the votes
cast by one voter will be linked. As in the current EIV scheme, each vote is encrypted by the public key
published by EO. Then, the ballot is formed with this encrypted vote, the voter’s signature and corresponding
election-specific signature verification key along with zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for voter’s eligibility
and correct signing key formation. After that, this ballot is sent to the vote collector for vote storing. Individual
3 See
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vote verification, the tallying and auditing processes are carried out as in the EIV IVXV framework.
We claim that the EIV-AC scheme satisfies eligibility verifiability and participation privacy, that is the
central election authorities and auditors will only be certain that the voter is eligible without actually identifying
her. Further, even if the voter casts many votes, only one will be included in the tallying process. Furthermore,
we discuss various deployment strategies for EIV-AC scheme.
Organization. In Section 2, we describe our notation and recall the necessary, the underlying cryptographic primitives and anonymous credentials. Our proposed protocol is given in Section 3. In Section 4, we
first give details of zero-knowledge proof of knowledge utilized in our protocol and informal security analysis,
and then discuss possible implementation framework and deployment strategies. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations
In the sequel, κ is the security parameter and “ ← ” and “ ←$ ” denote assigning an output value to a specific
variable and to a uniformly distributed variable of a set, respectively. {0, 1}∗ and {0, 1}κ respectively denote
an arbitrary length bit-string and a bit string of length κ .
The notation [a]P corresponds to a scalar multiplication, in an additive group, of a generator P ∈ G of
order p by a scalar a ∈ Zp , i.e. P + P + · · · + P , a times. We will use the following primitives
• Cryptographically secure hash-function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ ,
• Digital signature scheme Sig = (Gsig , Ksig , Ssig , Vsig ) where
– Setup (ppsig ← Gsig (κ)): Given a security parameter κ, yields public parameters as ppsig ,
– Keygen ((sk, pk) ← Ksig (ppsig )): Given public parameters ppsig , generates a private and public signing
key pair,
– Sign (σ ← Ssig (sk, m)): Given private signing key sk and a message m, signature σ for the message
m is generated,
– Verify ({0, 1} ← Vsig (pk, m, σ)): Given public key pk, a message m and signature σ , outputs 1 if
the signature σ is valid, otherwise outputs 0.
• Public key encryption scheme Pec = (Gpec , Kpec , Epec , Dpec ) where
– Setup (pppec ← Gpec (κ)): Given a security parameter κ , outputs public parameters as pppec ,
– Keygen ((sk, pk) ← Kpec (pppec )): Given public parameters pppec , generates a private and public
encryption key pair,
– Encrypt (c ← Epec (pk, m)): Given public key pk and a message m , encrypts the message m and
outputs ciphertext c,
– Decrypt (m ← Dpec (sk, c)): Given private key sk and a ciphertext c, decrypts c to m .
423

SERTKAYA et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

• The zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms and statements will be given as formalized
by [18]. For instance, P K{(a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) | ϕ(a1 , a2 , . . . , an )} denotes a prover convinces a verifier of
knowledge of values (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) that satisfies a predicate ϕ(a1 , a2 , . . . , an ).
Definition 1 [19] Let G1 , G2 (additively written) and GT (multiplicatively written) be groups of prime order
p . A pairing e is defined as a map e : G1 × G2 → GT having the following properties:
• bilinearity: for all A ∈ G1 , B ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp , we have
e([a]A, [b]B) = e(A, B)ab ,
• nondegenerecy: for A ̸= 0G1 , B ̸= 0G2 , e(A, B) ̸= 1GT , where 0G1 (resp. 0G2 and 1GT ) is the identity
element of G1 (resp. G2 and GT ).
Then, a bilinear environment is a tuple (p, G1 , G2 , GT , P, Q, e) where r, G1 , G2 , GT , and e are defined as above,
and P (resp. Q) is a generator of G1 (resp. G2 ).
2.2. Anonymous credentials
As illustrated in Figure 1, a basic anonymous credential-based self-sovereign identity scheme has users U, issuers
I and verifiers V as involved entities. Users are holders that receive issued credentials. Issuers grant and verify
the credentials of the users. Verifiers verify credentials of the users presented in plain, partially or fully hidden
form. For the sake of simplicity, all of the attributes except the first (named as master secret and denoted as

Figure 1. Anonymous credential based self-sovereign identity Data Model

m1 ) will be created by the central authority and proof presentation will be described as selective disclosure
of attribute predicates. Each of the holder’s credentials contains a master secret as a special attribute. This
master secret is used to prove that multiple anonymous credentials are linked to one and only one holder. The
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issuance of a credential is done based on a commitment of this master secret to ensure that the same master
secret is used in all of the user’s credentials, without revealing its value to the issuer. Therefore, the master
secret is the one secret that the holder holds very dearly, as it is essentially the keystone of her entire identity
set.
Distributed ledger technology is used as a verifiable data registry to store public parameters such as
credential formations, the underlying cryptographic primitives’ public keys and of course if necessary revocation
status of the anonymous credentials. An issuer may revoke any credential such that a holder and any verifiers
can know within a reasonable amount of time that credential was revoked. For an eﬀicient revocation process,
Merkle hash trees or cryptographic accumulators are utilized. Naturally, this scheme can be extended to allow
multiple issuers and more advanced proof predicates such as inequality, range, and set membership proofs. We
omit such extensions here, but for a more comprehensive protocol reader may refer to [20, 21].
Following [17, 21], anonymous credentials will be given based on the BBS+ signature scheme. We assume
that credentials will be parametrized by ℓ attributes and system parameters consisting of a security parameter
κ , bilinear environment (p, G1 , G2 , GT , P, Q, e) along with the generators P0 , P1 , . . . , Pℓ of G1 are constructed.
Any prover, who has a BBS+ signature (A, a, b) on attributes {mi }1≤i≤ℓ , can prove knowledge of the
signature while selectively disclosing some {mi }i∈D with D ⊆ {2, . . . , ℓ} , by randomizing the signature and
presenting the necessary proof. Setup, credential issuance and credential proof presentation with selective
disclosure can be outlined as follows.
• Issuer setup: Issuer I chooses skI ←$ Z∗p as her private key and pkI ← [skI ]Q . Optionally, I can also attach
a proof of knowledge of her private key.
• Credential issuance:
1. User U establishes a secure connection with I, proves her real world identity and gets a nonce
n1 ←$ {0, 1}κ , which will be used for proof freshness.
2. U chooses a master secret m1 ←$ Zp , a masking value b′ ←$ Zp , and computes a Pedersen
commitment C1 ← [b′ ]P0 + [m1 ]P1 along with a nonce n1 based proof
π1 ← P K{(m1 , b′ ) : C1 = [b′ ]P0 + [m1 ]P1 },
as described in Section 4.1. Then U sends (C1 , π1 ) to I.
3. I first verifies the proof π1 as described in Section 4.1, then creates U’s attributes as m2 , m3 , . . . , mℓ ,
chooses a, b′′ ←$ Zp and computes
A = [(a + skI )−1 ](P + [b′′ ]P0 + C1 +

ℓ
∑

[mi ]Pi ).

i=2

4. I then sends {{mi }2≤i≤ℓ , (A, a, b′′ )} to U.
5. U first assures the correctness of the attributes {mi }2≤i≤ℓ , next sets b ← b′ + b′′ , computes
B ← P + [b]P0 +

ℓ
∑

[mi ]Pi ,

i=1

and validates the signature by checking e(A, pkI + [a]Q) = e(B, Q) .
425

SERTKAYA et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

6. If the equations above hold, U stores her issued credential as
αU ← {{mi }1≤i≤ℓ , A, B, a, b}.
• Credential presentation by selective disclosure:
1. U gets the attribute disclosure set D ⊆ {2, 3, . . . , ℓ} and a nonce n2 ←$ {0, 1}κ from a verifier V
and checks that her credential αU fulfills the requirement.
2. U first randomizes her credential signature and by using n2 , creates a proof
′
π2 ← P K{({mi }i∈D
/ , a, r2 , r3 , b̄) : Ā − D = [−a]A + [r2 ]P0 ∧
∑
∑
P+
[mi ]Pi = [r3 ]D + [−b̄]P0 +
[mi ]Pi }.
i∈D

i∈D
/

as given in Section 4.1.
3. U finally sends ({mi }i∈D , A′ , Ā, D, π2 ) to V .
4. V accepts the presented proof only if A′ ̸= 0G1 (A′ is not the identity element of G1 ), e(A′ , pkI ) =
e(Ā, Q) and the verification given in Section 4.1 for π2 holds.
3. EIV-AC scheme
Similar to the EIV IVXV framework, the Election Organizer (EO), the Vote Collector (VC), the I-Ballot Box
Processor (IBBP) and the Tallier (T) are the core entities. Additionally, the Certification Authority (CA), the
Time-marking Service (TMS), the Registration Service (RS), the Data Auditors (DA) and eligible Voters ( V )
interact with the scheme. These core entities and their interactions are illustrated in Figure 2. As it can be

Figure 2. Core entities and their interactions within the EIV-AC scheme.
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deduced from Figure 2, self-sovereign identity is utilized as an external authenticator, its underlying permissioned
blockchain is governed by the national identity issuing/management body (in Estonian case, this would naturally
be Estonian Police and Border Guard Board). Here, the permissioned blockchain is in fact publicly readable
blockchain, therefore EIV-AC scheme’s vote collecting entity VC can read the necessary metadata for credential
verification.
We assume that each eligible voter holds her national ID as a unique anonymous credential issued by the
central authority (such as Police and Border Guard Board) and necessary public parameters are stored on a
distributed ledger.
∀v ∈ V, αv ← {{mi }1≤i≤ℓ , A, B, a, b}.
Pre-Voting Phase. For each election, the election organizer EO follows the steps given below as setup.
• Approves the election configuration, constructs the candidates slate Celc .
• Creates a unique election identifier telc ←$ Z∗p .
• Determines a public key encryption scheme Pec and generates an election key pair that is going to be used
for encrypting and decrypting the votes,
(skelc , pkelc ) ← Kpec (κ).
Any public key encryption scheme satisfying indistinguisability under chosen plaintext attack property
can be used, e.g., threshold ELGamal encryption [22] as in EIV.
• Chooses a digital signature scheme Sig, that is going to be used by voters to sign their votes and generates
its public parameters. Any digital signature scheme, that satisfies existentially unforgeability against
adaptive chosen message attacks, can be utilized. Here, we abuse the notation and create signing key
pairs based on the BBS+ signature’s pairing environment.
• Performs the role of T - to protect the election private key and to tabulate the voting result.
• Delegates the handling of the online voting phase to VC and the handling of the postvoting/pretabulation
offline phase to IBBP where both can be independent organizations.
• Determines a selective disclosure set Delc , on which anonymous credential proof presentations will be built
on, in a privacy preserving manner.
As explained in Section 2.2, the mi ’s, 1 < i ≤ ℓ, of the anonymous credential, are the holder’s attributes
including name, surname, birth date, birthplace, nationality, permanent address, etc. For instance, in the
parliament elections, Delc would be comprised of nationality and birth date, while in the local government
council elections, Delc would be comprised of nationality, birth date, and permanent address.
• While securely storing the private key skelc , publishes the public parameter ppelc as
ppelc ← (telc , Celc , pkelc , Delc ).
• Provides voting application VoteApp and individual verification application VerApp to the voters.
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Voting Phase. An eligible voter v ∈ V uses VoteApp to establish a secure connection with VC, gets the
candidate list Celc and a nonce n3 ←$ {0, 1}κ . Then v creates the double envelope for her candidate cv ∈ Celc
as follows.
C1 . The inner envelope is the encrypted choice εv ← Epec (pkelc , (cv , rv )) with a random bit string rv ∈ {0, 1}κ .
C2 . v creates the election specific signing key skv ← (m1 + telc )−1 and the corresponding public key pkv ←
[(m1 + telc )−1 ]Q, and signs the encrypted ballot as
σv = Ssig (skv , εv )
C3 . v randomizes her credential signature, creates a proof π3 for having a credential αv satisfying Delc and
correctly formed signing public key pkv ← [(m1 + telc )−1 ]Q:
π3 ← P K{({mi }i∈D
/ elc , a, r2 , r3 , b̄) :
Ā − D = [−a]A′ + [r2 ]P0 ∧
∑
∑
P+
[mi ]Pi = [r3 ]D + [−b̄]P0 +
[mi ]Pi

∧

i∈D
/ elc

i∈Delc

pkv = [(m1 + telc )−1 ]Q}.
where the index i runs over the indexes of attributes that are required to be revealed by the EO, as given
in Section 4.1.
C4 . the outer envelope is formed as bv ← (εv , σv , pkv , ({mi }i∈Delc , A′ , Ā, D, π3 )) and then it is sent to VC.
C5 . VC responds with a unique identifier bid and the RS confirmation regbid .
C6 . VoteApp verifies the digitally signed regbid with respect to H(bv ) .
C7 . VoteApp presents the vote identifier bid and rv in a QR code in order to be captured by VerApp.
Vote Storing Phase. In order to store a vote, VC needs to verify and register the vote.
S1 . VC accepts presented credential proof if and only if the credential is not revoked, A′ ̸= 0G1 , e(A′ , pkI ) =
e(Ā, Q) and the verification, given in Section 4.1, of π3 holds.
S2 . Then VC validates the signature σv included in bv by checking
1 ← Vsig (pkv , εv , σv ).
S3 . VC generates a unique random vote identifier bid .
S4 . VC acquires a time-mark tsbid ← Ssig (skTMS , (H(bv ), utcbid )), from the TMS to show that the data H(bv )
existed at the time utcbid .
S5 . VC sends a registration request reqbid ← Ssig (skVC , (bid , H(bv ))), to RS.
S6 . RS validates the signature reqbid and responds to VC with a signed confirmation regbid ← Ssig (skRS , H(reqbid )).
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S7 . VC sends the bid and the confirmation regbid to the voter’s VoteApp.
Any voter can cast vote multiple times. In this phase, all votes are stored without removal. Whenever a vote
storing process is completed successfully,
• VC stores (bv , bid , tsbid , regbid ) into the ballot set BVC ,
• RS stores (reqbid , regbid ) into the ballot registry set BRS .
Individual Vote Verifying Phase. Any voter, who wants to check her vote is recorded as cast,
optionally uses VerApp running on a mobile device.
V1 . VerApp captures the vote identifier bid and randomness rv from VoteApp through a QR code.
V2 . VerApp establishes an authenticated secure channel with VC and sends bid to the VC.
V3 . VC responds to VerApp with bv and regbid corresponding to the bid . In case of an unknown bid or exceeded
verification time frame, an error is returned.
V4 . VerApp verifies both bv and regbid .
V5 . VerApp uses Celc and the randomness rv to find a c′ ∈ Celc such that
Epec (pkpec , (c′ , rv )) = εv .
V6 . The result of this process -either the c′ or an error message- is displayed to the voter who has to decide
if the result reflects her will, i.e. c′ = cv .
Pre-Tabulation Phase. Following the completion of the online voting phase, digitally signed ballot set
BVC and registration query and response set BRS are respectively transferred from VC and RS to IBBP. Then
IBBP,
• verifies all double envelopes, checks eligibility and verifies registry confirmations,
• compares BVC and BRS , based on the voters’ signature verification keys {pkv }v∈V , composes new set
BIBBP by including only the last cast vote from each voter along with its registry confirmation,
• transmits the {pkv }v∈V set to EO and receives the ballot revocation list (based on the corresponding paper
vote existence),
• removes those ballots from BIBBP and extracts the encrypted vote set Belc ← {εv } that is going to be
tabulated.
Tabulation. EO decrypts the nonrevoked votes included in Belc with the election’s private key skelc
and publishes the election result along with a proof that assures all the procedures were correctly computed.
Naturally, election auditing is carried out as in the IVXV framework.
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4. Analysis and discussion
4.1. Zero knowledge proofs of knowledge
Details of π1 . User U uses π1 for proving the knowledge of the master secret m1 to the issuer I.
Recall that
π1 ← P K{(m1 , b′ ) : C1 = [b′ ]P0 + [m1 ]P1 }.
1. Prover chooses rm1 , rb′ ←$ Zp and computes
T1 ← [rb′ ]P0 + [rm1 ]P1 .
2. Using the nonce value n1 , prover computes
c1 ← H(n1 , T1 , C1 ),

sm1 ← rm1 − c1 m1 ,

sb′ ← rb′ − c1 b′ .

3. Then, prover sends (c1 , T1 , sm1 , sb′ ) as π1 to the verifier.
?

4. Verifier checks c1 = H(n1 , T1 , C1 ) with nonce n1 and
[sb′ ]P0 + [sm1 ]P1 = T1 − c1 C1 ,
if both verifications hold, the verifier accepts the proof.
Details of π2 . User U uses π2 for selectively disclosing some of her credentials to the verifier V and proving
that she owns a signature of issuer I on them without revealing all of the attributes and the signature itself.
In order to randomize the signature,
• U chooses r1 ←$ Z∗p , sets A′ ← [r1 ]A and computes Ā ← [r1 ]B + [−a]A′ .
• Next, U chooses r2 ←$ Zp , sets D ← [r1 ]B + [−r2 ]P0 , r3 ← r1−1 and b̄ ← b − r2 r3 .
Then,
′
π2 ← P K{({mi }i∈D
/ , a, r2 , r3 , b̄) : Ā − D = [−a]A + [r2 ]P0 ∧
∑
∑
P+
[mi ]Pi = [r3 ]D + [−b̄]P0 +
[mi ]Pi }.
i∈D
/

i∈D

is created and verified as follows.
1. Prover chooses
rmi ←$ Zp for i ∈
/ D and ra , rr2 , rr3 , rb̄ ←$ Zp ,
then computes
T1 ← [ra ]A′ + [rr2 ]P0 ,
T2 ← [rr3 ]D + [rb̄ ]P0 +

∑
i∈D
/
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2. Based on the nonce value n2 , prover computes
c2 ← H(n2 , A′ , Ā, D, T1 , T2 )
smi ← rmi − c2 mi

for all i ∈
/D

sa ← ra − c2 a
sr2 ← rr2 − c2 r2
sr3 ← rr3 − c2 r3
sb̄ ← rb̄ − c2 b̄
3. Finally, prover sends (c2 , T1 , T2 , {smi }i∈D
/ , sa , sr2 , sr3 , sb̄ ) as π2 .
4. To verify π2 , verifier first checks
c2 = H(n2 , A′ , Ā, D, T1 , T2 ),
?

with nonce n2 and then the following hold.
[sa ]A′ + sr2 P0 = T1 − [c2 ](Ā − D)
∑
∑
[smi ]Pi = T2 − [c2 ](P +
[sr3 ]D + [sb̄ ]P0 +
[mi ]Pi )
i∈D
/

i∈D

Lemma 1 [17] The construction of π2 forms a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a BBS+ signature for
signatures with A ̸= 1G1 .
Details of π3 . User U uses π3 for selectively disclosing some of her credentials to the verifier VC, her election
signing key is properly formed with the election’s tag telc and proving that she owns a signature of issuer I on
them without revealing all of the attributes and the signature itself.
In a similar way, the signature is randomized as follows.
• v chooses r1 ←$ Z∗p , sets A′ ← [r1 ]A and computes Ā ← [r1 ]B + [−a]A′ .
• Next, v chooses r2 ←$ Zp , sets D ← [r1 ]B + [−r2 ]P0 , r3 ← r1−1 and b̄ ← b − r2 r3 .
We rewrite π3 as
π3 ← P K{({mi }i∈D
/ elc , a, r2 , r3 , b̄) :
Ā − D = [−a]A′ + [r2 ]P0 ∧
∑
∑
P+
[mi ]Pi = [r3 ]D + [−b̄]P0 +
[mi ]Pi ∧
i∈Delc

i∈D
/ elc

[m1 ]pkv = Q − [telc ]pkv },
and proof creation and verification is pursued as follows.
1. Prover chooses
rmi ←$ Zp for i ∈
/ Delc and ra , rr2 , rr3 , rb̄ ←$ Zp ,
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then computes
T1 ← [ra ]A′ + [rr2 ]P0 ,
T2 ← [rr3 ]D + [rb̄ ]P0 +

∑

[rmi ]Pi ,

i∈D
/ elc

T3 ← [rm1 ]pkv
2. Based on the nonce value n3 , prover computes
c3 ← H(n3 , A′ , Ā, D, T1 , T2 , T3 )
smi ← rmi − c3 mi

for all i ∈
/ Delc

sa ← ra − c3 a
sr2 ← rr2 − c3 r2
sr3 ← rr3 − c3 r3
sb̄ ← rb̄ − c3 b̄
3. Finally, prover sends (c3 , T1 , T2 , T3 , {smi }i∈D
/ elc , sa , sr2 , sr3 , sb̄ ) as π3 .
4. In order to verify π3 , the verifier first checks
c3 = H(n3 , A′ , Ā, D, T1 , T2 , T3 ),
?

with nonce n3 and then the following hold.
[sa ]A′ + sr2 P0 = T1 − [c3 ](Ā − D)
∑
∑
[smi ]Pi = T2 − [c3 ](P +
[sr3 ]D + [sb̄ ]P0 +
[mi ]Pi ),
i∈D
/ elc

i∈Delc

[sm1 ]pkv = T3 − [c3 ](Q − [telc ]pkv ).
Lemma 2 The construction of π3 forms a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a BBS+ signature for signatures
with A ̸= 1G1 .
Proof

The proof follows easily from Lemma 1 and its proof given in [17].

2

4.2. Security analysis
Naturally, the security analysis of EIV-AC scheme heavily relies on IVXV framework’s assumptions and properties. The IVXV framework addresses individual verifiability with the optional individual verification tool, and
universal verifiability by distributing the central roles among independent entities, and strictly logging and
auditing these entities. Similarly, as in the IVXV framework, the EIV-AC scheme supports casting multiple
Internet voting and paper-based voting on the election day to ensure a considerable level of coercion-resistance.
Due to the space constraint, here we are going to focus on eligibility verifiability and participation privacy.
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• Eligibility verifiability requires that anyone can check that each vote in the election outcome is cast by an
eligible voter and at most one vote per voter is included in the tallying [2]. In order to break the eligibility
verifiability property of EIV-AC scheme, an adversary has to either forge an anonymous credential with
nonrevocation proof or construct more than one signature key pair for an election from an anonymous
credential. The digital signature scheme Sig and the proof π3 assures that the voter’s signing key pair
is formed as skv ← (m1 + telc )−1 and pkv ← [(m1 + telc )−1 ]Q, where m1 is the master secret included in
national ID credential αv . This ensures that for each αv , there exists a unique signing key pair. Since the
ballots are bound with the signature verification key, multiple ballots with the same signature verification
key are processed uniquely based on the revoting policy. On the other hand, the former contradicts
with the existential unforgeability property, against adaptive chosen message attacks under the q-SDH
assumption, of the BBS+ signature scheme [17], and the nonrevocation status of the credential assured by
the SSI’s distributed ledger. Besides, anyone who has access to Belc and BIBBP along with the respective
nonce values can check that only the eligible voters’ vote is included in tallying.
• Participation privacy requires that the fact of whether or not an eligible voter has participated in the
election should not be disclosed to the passive adversary who only has access to the public output [3].
Here, we assume that the central authorities including EO, VC, RS and IBBP, are honest-but-curious
and they would try to identify the participants. Naturally, participation privacy assumes that the voters
are not actively trying to prove that they abstained or participated in the election and an anonymous
communication channel is already established4 . In order to break the participation privacy property of
the EIV-AC scheme, an adversary should distinguish a ballot bv for an eligible voter v . However, this
would contradict the pseduo-randomness of key generation that is assured by q-DDHI assumption, see
specifically Theorem 3 in [23].
4.3. Discussion
The EIV-AC scheme makes use of external authentication with anonymous credentials. This naturally requires
a nation-wide adoption of the self-sovereign identity model. Sovrin Foundation is building a self-sovereign
identity solution based on the Hyperledger Indy project. Even if it currently supports RSA-based anonymous
credentials, BBS+ signature based anonymous credentials integration is proposed and implemented [21]. On
the other hand, using anonymous credentials as external authentication is not mandatory. Indeed, in a similar
way to [4], anonymous credentials can be mounted as internal authentication, and hence issued by the election
organizer EO as given in Section 2.2. This variation would still support participation privacy due to BBS+
signature randomization and Lemma 2.
In order to deploy the EIV-AC scheme along with paper-based voting, eligible voters must be authenticated
via their anonymous credentials and hence their election-specific signature verification key must be obtained
to assure vote uniqueness. Voters’ election-specific signature verification key is the only link that binds the
ballots. As stated earlier, if a voter casts a paper vote in the election, it is tallied and the cast votes via EIV
are revoked. In this way, if a privacy preserving selective disclosure set is determined, paper-based voting can
also be pursued in accordance with the participation privacy property.
As for eﬀiciency, BBS+ signatures are in the flexible Type-3 pairing setting and more eﬀicient than previous Camenisch-Lysanskaya like signatures [17]. Indeed, component sizes for the generic bilinear environment
4 Please refer to Wikipedia Anonymity Networks Category for possible anonymity network solutions to resist de-anonymization
by the IP addresses.
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Table . BBS+ signature element sizes.

Private key
Public key
Signature
Proof

Generic size
1Zp
1G2
1G1 + 2Zp
5G1 + (4 + #{hidden attributes})Zp

Size with BLS12-381
32 bytes
96 bytes
112 bytes
368 + 32 · #{hidden attributes}

and particular construction over BLS12-381 curve are listed in Table . Several cryptographic libraries such as
Apache’s Milagro Library already include support for BLS12-381. For specific construction of BBS+ signature
with BLS12-381 curve, reader may refer to [21] and Hyperledger Indy and Ursa Github repositories5 .
5. Conclusion
In essence, following the concerns on the current eID solutions, this manuscript proposes an e-voting scheme
EIV-AC that integrates anonymous credential-based self-sovereign identity into the EIV scheme. The EIV-AC
scheme particularly utilizes BBS+ signatures as an external authentication process for proving voters’ eligibility.
In addition to the current scheme’s security features, this scheme further provides participation privacy, hides
the fact of whether or not an eligible voter has cast a vote, so that it concord more with privacy enhancing and
data minimization regulations. The main limitation on the adoption of our scheme is the necessity of a new
national identity solution deployment that supports anonymous credentials and self-sovereignty. Enrichment of
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and further minimization of the trust on the central roles remain as future
work.
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